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•	 OA is not about abandoning peer review but it does provide the 
opportunity to rethink its role and our methods.
•	 67% of existing OA journals do not charge APCs and yet 
academics have tended to steer clear of them.
•	 People opt for recognised outlets because of the (erroneously) 
perceived emphasis on publication venue by accreditation 
structures such as RAE/REF/tenure.
•	 In the print world peer review was historically linked to page 
limits; these do not apply in the electronic realm.
•	 Double blind review is a misnomer and even then preserved 
anonymity can be problematic.
•	 The alternative is to publish everything that meets a certain 
threshold of academic soundness and to let readers decide what 
should last; in effect a kind of post-publication, or peer-to-peer, 
review.
•	 This modification of peer review could lead to more collaboration 
and less insistence on an individual finished product.
Introduction
As Peter Suber notes in his commendable book, open access is not about 
circumventing peer review.1 In fact, the only aims of the Open Access 
movement that can be stated with conviction are the removal of price 
barriers and the lowering of permission barriers.2 These elements are to 
be achieved through an adaptation of scholarly publishing practice to the 
mutations in technology that allow for non-rivalrous commodity exchange 
of works upon which the authors do not rely for income; the ability to 
disseminate perfect copies of academic material to anybody who can get 
access to the Internet at an extremely reduced, even if nominally non-
zero, cost.
Given that this is the case – and you will note that there is specifically 
no mention of peer review practice in the above definition – why is it 
necessary to debate peer review at all? I would suggest that there are two 
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reasons why peer review must not remain the unmentioned elephant 
in the room when we talk about open access. Firstly, it is a frequent 
accusation of detractors that the changes introduced by open access 
models will lead to a slippage of standards in one way or another, an 
aspect that must be dispelled. Secondly, these shifts in practice at the 
reader-side allow us the space to rethink peer review and to ask whether 
there are analogous changes, facilitated either socially or technologically, 
that could be worth exploring at this time of transition. In fact, just as one 
of the arguments for open access is that it is culturally elitist and untenable 
to presume that a broader audience can neither understand nor appreciate 
scholarship, there are, I would argue, parallels in peer review practice that 
could reflect this same principle on an intra-academy basis. 
The primary reason behind this assertion is that, at a fundamental level, 
the gatekeeper model – that is, the system of deciding on permissibility 
before publication through both publisher policies and peer-review 
practice – also works on a series of unspoken ideological assumptions 
that are never wholly objective and apolitical, but rather based on a series 
of exclusions and marginalisations in exactly the same way as the elitism 
argument pre-defines its audience. Indeed, while the argument-by-
elitism, as it could be called, contends that it requires tuition and process 
to navigate the labyrinth of scholarship and disregards John Willinsky’s 
comprehensive arguments for technical solutions to this, exemplified in the 
‘reading tools’ component of his OJS software,3 what of the students who 
graduate from this process and who are then still financially excluded from 
it? Does not the argument-by-elitism purport to teach critical thinking but 
then deprives those taught of the material with which to critically engage 
once they leave the university? What about those institutions who cannot 
afford subscriptions but whose staff are perfectly capable of understanding 
scholarly research and its production contexts?
Likewise, however, within our own academic circles, a gatekeeper model 
pre-defines its audience and disregards a series of important questions. 
For example, how can we wholly know the value of the material that we 
are pre-excluding given that we exist within ideologies that are not always 
explicitly clear from our immanent positions? How do we know what will 
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be of value in the future? What do we make of the exclusions and other 
spaces that, under the gatekeeper model, we cannot even know at present? 
Without wanting to seem Panglossian, for moves to open access should not 
be naively utopian, if we mark some aspects of the move to open access as 
challenges, the arguments for open access also present new opportunities 
in the realm of peer review as in the counterbalanced increased access 
to readers.
Quality, prestige and labour
In order to understand the potential routes of the future, it is important 
to understand the future’s roots in the present and the past. It is also 
important to note, up front, that I am dealing primarily here with the state 
of the Humanities as this is the area with which I am most familiar. Turning 
then to the current state of peer review, it is worth noting that, as it stands, 
in many disciplinary spheres, academic publishers believe themselves to 
be responsible for the quality of the academic material that appears within 
their titles. This has been the case traditionally and continues to be the 
norm in the open access sphere with SAGE Open declaring their journal an 
ideal venue for ‘Authors who want their articles to receive quality reviews 
and efficient production’.4 What is worth exploring, as a preliminary rebuff 
to those who simplistically equate open access with a decline in standards, 
is the way in which prestige is actually formulated.
The first and most important aspect to grasp (and one that seems 
incredibly obvious once articulated) is that the gatekeeper model, in 
which material is pre-screened for worthiness, relies upon (almost 
always uncompensated) academic, not publisher, labour. Validation is 
performed through a hidden but nonetheless presumed process whereby 
academics confer acceptability upon the piece in question. In many of 
the Humanities and Social Science systems, this process is undertaken 
on a double blind basis, meaning that, in theory at least, neither the 
author nor the reviewer(s) are aware of each other’s identities. In any 
case, though, the system that is erected here is one wherein academics 
cyclically confer prestige upon a journal twofold by submitting their 
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pieces to the venue that they believe to be the most prestigious and 
by reviewing with strict (even if unformulated) standards for those 
same destinations. Furthermore, reviewer selection is often the task of 
an academic editor who knows the field as, unsurprisingly, they are 
nearly always better placed to know the most appropriate reviewer than 
commercial publishers. In short: the gatekeeper process, from reviewer 
selection through to submission and review itself, all of which are the only 
parts of publishing that confer authority upon academic worthiness, are 
voluntarily undertaken by academics.
It should be clear, from the above, that there is, therefore, theoretically 
no reason why a Gold open access venue (which, remember, does not 
necessarily mean an ‘author pays’ article processing charge (APC), no 
matter how frequently less informed commentators uncritically repeat 
this assertion) could not accumulate substantial academic credibility, 
should it attract the prerequisite submissions and reviewers. The one 
caveat that I will add, however, is that it is imperative, if a journal does 
follow an APC model that review and ability to pay are strictly separated. 
This is not always guaranteed to be the case and aspects of an author pays 
model could lean towards unethical practices, as Jeffrey Beall’s list of 
‘predatory open access publishers’ demonstrates.5 Although I readily see 
the danger of review corruption in the APC model (of which I am not a 
fan in any case), two objections can be raised, however, to the restriction of 
this predatory mode to open access: 1) does not the 300% above inflation 
increase in journal subscription costs since 1986 smack of an overarchingly 
predatory field in the first place? 6 2) it is easy to spot these publishers 
through either Beall’s criteria,7 or simply their lack of academic credentials, 
non-membership of publishing ethics organisations such as COPE or lack 
of explicit policies for separation of finance from review, just as it is in non-
open access venues.
Given the freedom, to date, of academics to act as the king-makers of 
their publication venues, it is surprising, for an optimist, that open 
access venues have not fared better. After all, at present, 66.7% of open 
access journals in the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ) do not 
implement APCs, so they carry no financial cost either to publish in or to 
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obtain.8 Indeed, despite the inability of university library budgets to keep 
pace with subscriptions, academics have, for the most part, continued to 
invest their academic capital in traditional (and expensive) journals, thus 
perpetuating these venues’ prestige (and cost). There are, however, other 
mechanisms that have stifled the uptake of open access that relate to quality 
control, the most notable of which for the UK is the ‘peer review of peer 
reviews’ that is the Research Excellence Framework (REF) and its Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE) precursor. The repeated assertion of REF panel 
members that publication destination will not be used as a criterion has 
often been treated with scepticism by universities and researchers. This 
has led, in conjunction with hiring and firing procedures, to a strongly 
conservative disciplinary mechanism that, itself, in part, restricts academic 
freedom; researchers publish where they feel will do the most for their 
REF return (regardless of the truth of such statements) or employability 
and, in many cases, fledgling open access journals are not believed to fulfil 
these (imaginary) criteria.9 While the current consultation by the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England looks set to mandate Gold/Green 
open access for any post-2014 REF, the fact that this is being considered 
after the Finch fait accompli of making Gold open access synonymous 
with APCs means that the moment for radical (and beneficial) economic 
transformation through academic agency in conferring validation through 
peer review has, once more, almost passed.
The current problems of peer review
Leaving aside now the issues of whether open access must intrinsically 
disregard, or experiment with, peer review (there is no reason why it 
should, in either case), I want now to turn to an analysis of the current 
workings of peer review within Humanities and Social Sciences 
disciplines, the potential pitfalls of the extant systems and to give some 
examples and suggestions for ways in which the system might be re-
worked. It is worth stressing that I believe that there is no necessary causal 
need for open access to tinker with peer review but I wish to also state that 
the born-digital medium of open access publications may lend itself to new 
modes that were impossible under the model of its print predecessor.
74 Martin Paul Eve
In order to think through peer review in the present moment, it 
is necessary to briefly lay out the mechanism that propelled the 
gatekeeper model to dominance: print economics. Historically, one of 
the key functions of the gatekeeper has been to reduce the quantity of 
permissible material. This was not only an effort to avert what we now 
call ‘information overload’ and what are perceived as low standards, but 
also because each issue of a print journal had a specified page budget. In 
the world of print and physical commodities, there is a need to restrict 
the quantity of output because there is a material cost for each page that 
is printed and distributed. This is, clearly, no longer the case but persists 
through a culture that Gary Hall calls our ‘paper-centrism’.10
While, therefore, we most often like to think of peer review via the 
gatekeeper as an issue that pertains strictly to academic standards, 
there is also an economic history of which it is easy to lose sight. This, 
though, is not the sole problem of the gatekeeper system, especially 
as it applies to the double blind review system in many Humanities 
disciplines. Indeed, the first question that springs to mind is whether it is 
right that a mere two academics, in most instances, although sometimes 
only one, have the private, unaccountable, final word on an article’s 
acceptability. For Early Career Researchers (ECRs) this private decision 
can be the difference between a lifetime of employment in academia or 
a lengthy period of re-training. Furthermore, to repeat, looking outside 
the academy briefly, one of the arguments made against open access is 
that there may be no need for public access to scholarship; perhaps, it is 
claimed, the public won’t understand or value our contributions. The 
problem with this argument, again citing Peter Suber, is the question 
of how anyone can ‘know in advance the level of demand for peer-
reviewed work among lay readers’.11 The same argument can be made 
for an ‘informed’ audience, though. How can one accurately pre-judge, 
within one’s own temporal, geographical and disciplinary immanence, 
what may be of worth to scholars free of these constraints? This lack of 
accountability and, as will be explored below, logic in the admissibility 
of papers is a problem that is exacerbated by the traditional double-
blind system. 
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Taking a slightly different tack first, however, it is worth querying the exact 
extent to which the double blind method might actually be a misnomer. 
Theoretically, the author should be unaware of the identity of his or her 
reviewers and vice versa. The benefits of this are easy to articulate: it is 
designed to encourage an impartial assessment of the work, rather than 
the author. Furthermore, reviewers are supposed to be protected from 
professional repercussions in cases where, for instance, the author is a 
prominent figure in their field. Often, however, this is utopian. In many 
small fields where work may have been presented in early versions at 
conferences, where authors are known for adopting a specific stance, or 
simply through flawed meta-data erasure and/or slips of self-citation, the 
identity of the author can be ascertained. While it is less often that slips 
occur the other way around, it is often possible to guess the most likely 
reviewer of one’s work simply by dint of their expertise.
Furthermore, anonymity can be problematic. The lack of accountability 
of reviewers can lead to harsh, penalising reviews, rather than feedback 
that, while rigorous, intends to work in community to elevate a work 
to a publishable standard. Additionally, there is also something strange 
about the perseverance of anonymity after publication. Universities and 
academia function, as Martin McQuillan put it to me, on genealogies 
of validation; that is, on hierarchies of prestige that trace the flow of 
academic ‘capital’ and authority through publications. As explored above, 
journals are only as valuable as the genealogies that validate their work 
as high quality, through submission quantity/quality and rejection rate, 
underpinned by the labour of peer review. However, in the current way 
of working, what remains is a situation where, instead of the process of 
review being visible in order to validate the work, the quality of the review 
process and the prestige of the people doing the review must be inferred 
from the perceived post-publication quality of the publication.
To rephrase this: there are, under current practice, only two ways, both 
flawed, in which the quality of the review can be ascertained. The first of 
these is through trust in nominal journal brand. While there are some good 
practical arguments for this (i.e. when a journal continually publishes good 
material, then it’s probable that their review process is solid) there are also 
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some problems, most notably that a ‘journal’ seems too wide a measure of 
quality. As aspects of the journal change (for instance, editor resignation, 
editorial board changes, financial problems), the quality of output could 
decline but awareness of this will always be outdated as it takes a long 
while for a drop in quality to register in the general perception of scholars. 
During this period of unawareness, the journal (based on historical 
prestige precedent) would continue to attract high quality submissions 
and would, therefore, find it easier to recover; just one further instance 
that demonstrates the way in which academic prestige is a top-loaded, 
non-trickle-down economy.
The second way in which journal quality is crudely measured and the 
one that surely most affects scholars’ perceptions lies in the duplication 
of labour when reading a paper; a type of second review in which 
academics bring their own evaluative skills to bear on already published 
work. Clearly, this is inherent in the act of reading an academic paper 
but the blame for poor quality is put down to either the author or to the 
journal brand. This is interesting; what seems to have failed is actually 
the peer review, gatekeeping function, but this is not, in a mode of journal 
brand, the way in which it is perceived. While in some ways this is a fair 
appraisal, there could be ways in which the journal could signal the degree 
of delegation and trust that has been relied upon and to which I will now 
turn my attention.
What is to be done?
The most obvious way in which we might begin to address these problems 
at the moment of transition to open access is to rethink anonymity in the 
review process, as has already happened in many scientific disciplines. 
However, it is worth saying up front that each of the various combinations 
of the review anonymity matrix comes with its own problems and it may 
be the case that none are, in the end, as satisfactory as blind review, except, 
perhaps, for at least being more honest about the potential flaws. The first 
of these potential changes would be to remove the author’s anonymity 
while maintaining the anonymity of the reviewers, which seems to 
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add very little. Reviewers could judge solely on the past reputation 
of the author, rather than the merit of the piece alone while remaining 
unaccountable for their actions.
Conversely, we could take the opposite stance and remove reviewer 
anonymity (at various stages in the process, but primarily after the 
review and regardless of outcome) while retaining the author’s veil. This 
mode brings absolute accountability upon reviewers while protecting the 
author from pre-judgements. It also gives a clear genealogy of validation 
and militates against corruption to some degree as any conflicts of 
interest would be immediately clear. The disadvantages of this approach 
are also obvious, though. Any system that brings unbalanced extreme 
accountability will result in a conservative situation of strict, normative 
appraisals, thereby potentially ruling out a whole body of useful work 
that may be barred by the gatekeeper. While some may see this as an 
advantage – a tightening of review standards – given the historical 
parallel to page budgets and evolutions in social and technological 
filtering processes (see below), the argument for this may be less solid 
than might be thought. Finally, although this approach in some ways 
helps spot corruption through transparency, the extreme burden to ‘make 
the right call’ could encourage reviewers to seek the author’s identity. 
This tactic exposes reviewers and makes a thankless task perhaps even 
more risky.
What, then, about completely removing all anonymity from the process? 
There are some advantages in this case (as outlined above) but there still 
remains no counterbalance to the elements of conservatism that could arise 
as a result of exposing reviewers. Conversely, reviewers would surely also 
be prone to appraise the authors’ identity in this case.
Evidently, in each of the cases where anonymity is removed, during the 
review process itself, there are problems that seem, to some degree, worse 
than the flaws in a double blind setup. However, this only applies when 
we assume that we are dealing with a gatekeeper model in which a paper 
only sees the light of day so that the journal may be associated with the 
most exclusive papers in order to protect its brand. Other, more radical, 
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experiments in the sciences have worked to change this. For instance, the 
review criteria of PLOS ONE reads as follows:
Too often a journal’s decision to publish a paper is dominated by what 
the Editor/s think is interesting and will gain greater readership – both of 
which are subjective judgments and led to decisions which are frustrating 
and delay the publication of your work. PLOS ONE will rigorously peer 
review your submissions and publish all papers that are judged to be 
technically sound. Judgments about the importance of any particular 
paper are then made after publication by the readership (who are the most 
qualified to determine what is of interest to them).12
At first, in a knee-jerk reaction, this standard of publishing all papers that 
are ‘technically sound’ appears to have no analogue in the Humanities. 
As a hypothesis, though, a ‘technically sound’ paper in the Humanities 
could evince an argument, make reference to the appropriate range of 
extant scholarly literature, it could be written in good, standard prose 
of an appropriate register that demonstrates a coherence of form and 
content, it could show a good awareness of the field within which it was 
situated, it could pre-empt criticisms of its own methodology or argument 
and it would be logically consistent. While this is just a cursory stab at a 
definition and not meant to be finalised, implemented criteria, many of the 
problems of the review system as it stands could certainly be addressed 
through the formation of explicit consensus as to what constitutes 
an acceptable barrier to entry in the Humanities, so as to remove the 
Kafka-esque situation from which this paper takes its name: at present 
it can seem as though we each have our own personal gatekeeper with 
impenetrable logic.
Secondly, though, the inversion that PLOS ONE effects upon the original 
goal of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society to assess on the 
‘importance or singularity of their subjects’ could leave it open, as was 
the Transactions, to John Hill’s 1751 critique of the inclusion of ‘trivial 
and downright foolish articles’.13 The difference in situation to the 
contemporary, however, lies in the economic situation and technological 
filters at our disposal. In 2013, we have sophisticated full-text and social 
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search mechanisms that can bury unpopular material on the furthest 
pages of results but without removing such items from the economy 
altogether. The advantage of this, as with the arguments for open access 
more generally predicated upon an anti-elitism, is that we dismiss our 
own arrogance of knowing what will be important for all time and replace 
it twofold with the mechanism to ensure that what is relevant now is 
found and valued while also allowing those papers in niche fields or in 
areas that have yet to gain any prominence to be found, if and only if the 
seeker desires. In this mode of post-publication review, everything will 
be assessed, but it will be done after the fact and the exclusion of material 
will not be a permanent pre-silencing, but rather a process of continuous 
community consensus. Of course, there is no guarantee that the peer-
review criterion of ‘technical soundness’, however translated, will be free 
of abuse in itself, but this could be a step in the right direction.
This raises an aspect that I’ve left until the close of this piece to explicitly 
articulate under the bipartite logic both that it is Kathleen Fitzpatrick who 
deserves the most honourable and prestigious place on the topic, but also 
because it closes the loop of necessity of reform alongside technological 
innovation with which I began. In her seminal book on the subject, Planned 
Obsolescence, Fitzpatrick systematically interrogates Humanities’ peer 
review practices in the age of the digital and concludes that we require 
a mode that is less certain of the merits of ‘the stability that we’ve long 
assumed in the print universe’ and one that is more adaptive to generative 
possibilities.14 What Fitzpatrick addresses, in essence, is the problem of 
the fundamentally anti-collaborative nature of Humanities research in 
most cases. At present, review is not usually a community endeavour but 
rather an activity that expects to see a final artefact in which no traces of 
the construction remain visible. Experiments such as McKenzie Wark’s 
collaboration with the Institute for the Future of the Book on his 2007 
Gamer Theory suggest, however, that while an online collaborative model 
currently solicits sub-optimal levels of participation, there can be merit in 
the process.15 Most importantly, though, I want to use my final words to 
reiterate, but modify, my opening gambit. Fitzpatrick astutely notes that, in 
this case (and others), ‘the system that needs the most careful engineering 
is less technical than it is social’.16 Bearing this in mind, we must be careful 
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never to succumb at any point to a techno-fetishism but always consider 
whether the technological facilitates desirable social changes. We have 
built, over many years, systems for appraising the individual rather than 
acknowledging the way in which knowledge is collaboratively produced 
and, for the first time in many years, we may have an opening through 
which to address this. Open access does not require us to change our 
peer-review practices any more than the codex meant that readers had 
to abandon their palaeographic antecedents. There might, however, be 
practical ways in which a moment of technological change could enable us 
to see, with apologies for inverting Churchill’s well-known aphorism, that 
perhaps our review practices are not so wholly democratic, not so entirely 
objective, fair, or community-based; that they may not be the best that have 
been tried, apart from all the others.
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